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Abstract 
Participants in a supply chain of agricultural value-added products face significant 
challenges. Many of the costly distinctive traits are difficult (if not impossible) to observe 
even after consumption. A complicating factor, addressed here, is that in some 
circumstances delivered quality can only be imperfectly learned and/or affected 
stochastically by producers. In order for markets for these goods to arise, firms touting 
the quality of the product need to be trusted. In response to these challenges, new (and 
diverse) quality assurance systems (QASs) that facilitate the acquisition and flow of 
information about agricultural and food products are being put in place. A repeated-
purchases model is developed to explore the fundamental economic factors that lie 
behind the choice of different QASs and their associated degrees of stringency by firms. 
Differences in the quality discoverability of a sought-after attribute, market structure, 
attractiveness of a market, nature of reputations, and the value placed in the future are 
among the factors contributing to the implementation of widely diverse systems across 
participants in different markets. Close attention is paid to the role of reputations in 
providing the incentives for firms to deliver high-quality goods. We model three different 
scenarios—monopoly, duopoly with firm-specific reputations, and duopoly with 
industry-wide reputations—and compare the resulting welfare of processors and their 
customers. We also provide a rationale for the branding efforts of many firms to 
distinguish their products along the supply chain.   
 
Keywords: imperfect information, product quality, quality assurance, repeated 
purchases, reputations, supply chain, value-added agriculture. 
 
  
 
REPUTATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND THE CHOICE OF  
QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
Food manufacturers increasingly use quality assurance systems (QASs) to provide 
information about product attributes to consumers and/or downstream processors. The 
types of QASs include certification marks, traceability programs, third-party auditing 
programs, and producer-signed affidavits. Firms use QASs to obtain a market advantage 
and to build their reputation as a provider of products with claimed attributes. However, 
given the inherent quality heterogeneity of agricultural output (Ligon 2002), QASs can 
only increase the probability that a product has a claimed attribute. We are interested here 
in providing insight into how optimizing firms choose the optimal degree of “stringency” 
or assurance in their QAS. We model stringency as the probability that a product has a 
claimed attribute.  
Firms choose among QASs knowing that their competition also has the opportunity 
to choose a QAS. Thus, the optimal choice of stringency will generally depend on the 
level of stringency that competing firms choose so that firms compete in both output and 
reputation. Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) have studied the role of reputa-
tion as a deception-preventing device, examining a situation where quality is completely 
determined by a producer’s investments. We build on these previous studies by linking 
firm reputation to the choice of stringency in a QAS and modeling this choice as a func-
tion of the degree to which consumers can discover whether the sought-after attribute is 
actually present; the potential price premium paid for the attribute; the market structure in 
which firms compete; and the nature of firm reputation. 
 
Modeling Quality Assurance 
We model a situation that is becoming pervasive in the food industry, whereby an 
input buyer requires its suppliers to implement a QAS (Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker 
1998; Reardon and Farina 2001; Northen 2001; Fearne, Hornibrook, and Dedman 2001). 
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The information obtained through the QAS may allow the processing firm to better sort 
the input it buys, to gain a better idea of the actual quality of the inputs, and to be able to 
convey assurance to its customers about the quality of its product.  
The topic of this paper is relevant in an environment in which quality is variable and 
difficult to verify. Many food attributes can be thus classified (see, e.g., Caswell and  
Mojduszka 1996; Antle 1996; and Unnevehr and Jensen 1996). Clearly, if quality is read-
ily observable by both input buyers and consumers, there is no need for a QAS in the 
procurement process.  
We define a high-quality product as one that is certified as meeting an agreed-upon 
standard. The stringency of a selected QAS informs the processor about the proportion of 
the purchased input that actually meets the standard. Whether a particular unit of input 
meets the standard is unknown. We assume that the quality of the processed output has a 
direct relationship to its input counterpart, an assumption that is equivalent to claiming 
that the processing technology cannot be used as a substitute for input quality, or that it 
does so only at prohibitively high costs. We assume also that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the amount of input bought and output sold by a processor. Hence, 
the production technology works in a Leontief fashion, and the decision on the output 
rate essentially determines how much of the agricultural input is needed.  
Let the random vector Q  denote the vector of imperfectly observable quality attrib-
utes. For tractability we assume that only one quality attribute is of interest. The 
unconditional cumulative distribution function of Q  that is available in the market is 
( ) ( )PrQ QF q Q q= ≤  for all q. This approach accommodates both the case in which the 
quality attribute or trait is the production method itself and the case in which the process 
alters the probability distribution of quality. The former has an analog to a discrete attrib-
ute (the good was produced using a desired process or it was not), whereas quality in the 
latter case is a continuous random variable whose distribution is altered by the process 
followed. In the continuous case, let Mq  be the minimum quality standard. Hence, 
( )MQF q  is the unconditional probability that the product is inferior or unacceptable.  
In the discrete case, the input has or fails to have a particular attribute or was or was 
not produced following a value-adding (cost-increasing) production process. For exam-
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ple, eggs can be produced using animal welfare enhancing techniques (such as free-range 
production) or by conventional means. The processor buys from producers who have the 
capabilities needed to produce, and are believed to produce, following the desired proc-
esses. Having the capabilities does not necessarily mean that the process will be strictly 
followed under conditions of imperfect information. Because production of the high-
quality input is costlier than production for a commodity market, and there is a strictly 
positive probability that deviant behavior will not be discovered and penalized, suppli-
ers will find it rational to deviate from perfect compliance.1,2 Hence, there is a strictly 
positive fraction of the output that will not be produced under the desired cost-
increasing conditions. This fraction is again represented by FQ (qM). 
Let { }: O US s s s s= ∈ℜ ≤ ≤  be the set of alternative QASs where Os s=  represents 
the absence of quality verification and Us s=  represents perfect revelation of quality. The 
processor that procures raw materials from certified suppliers using the QAS indexed by 
s expects to certify a fraction of good-quality input, denoted by ( ) ( )1 Ms F q sλ = −  and a 
fraction ( ) ( )1 MQs F q s− λ =  of the inferior input. All certified input purchased will be 
processed and sold to downstream customers as possessing the desired trait.  
Implementation of different levels of stringency switches the relevant distributions 
for quality as follows. For any ,i js s S∈  there is an associated conditional distribution for 
quality, namely, ( )iQF q s  and ( )jQF q s . Increasing the level of stringency involves 
moving from is  to js  where i js s≤  leads to a first-order stochastically dominating shift 
on the distribution of quality. Therefore, ( ) ( )i jQ QF q s F q s≥  for all q Q∈ . In particular, 
this implies that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1j M j M i is F q s F q s sλ = − ≥ − = λ . Increasing s reduces the 
probability of incurring both type I errors (rejecting an input that is of good quality) and 
type II errors (certifying a product that is of low quality). We assume that ( )QF q s  is dif-
ferentiable with respect to s. 
Adoption of a QAS by processors incurs a cost, which can include compensation for 
sellers’ implementation costs and the costs of monitoring. We capture such costs for firm 
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i with a cost function ( ), iC s y , with ( ), 0iC y s s∂ ∂ >  and ( ), 0i iC y s y∂ ∂ > , where iy  
is output. 
Participation in the certified market for high-quality goods yields a per-period profit 
of ( ) ( ) ( ), , ; ; ,i r iy s a R y a C y sπ = − , where the revenue function ( );R y a  potentially de-
pends on the vector of firms’ output, ( , )i iy y y−=  and an indicator of the strength or size 
of consumer preference for high-quality goods, a . Clearly, ( ); 0R y a a∂ ∂ > . The super-
script in the profit function represents the state of the world, where processor i  has 
reputation r. 
We could append a term to the profit function, representing the economic loss due to 
certifying a product that is of low quality. This would require specification of a damage 
function due to the discovery of false certification. We capture punishment to a processor 
that is discovered as falsely certifying a product by assuming that the firm loses its repu-
tation, which forces it out of the certified market.3 Note however that the “reputable” 
processor obtains the price for the certified commodity no matter what the actual quality 
might be, because customers cannot assert a priori whether the claims made by the proc-
essor are false. In other words, processors will be trusted until proven wrong. Consumers’ 
trust is what defines the states of the world in this model. For a given processor, demand 
is state contingent, where the states of the world reflect whether it is trusted by consumers 
or not. For this sort of punishment mechanism to have an impact on a firm’s decisions, 
modeling more than one period is required (Klein and Leffler 1981). 
We introduce [0,1]ω∈ to measure the degree to which consumers can ascertain the 
actual quality of the good, where 1ω =  implies that quality is perfectly observable after 
consumption, or the sought-after characteristic is an experience attribute. Credence at-
tributes are represented by 0ω = .  
We are now in a position to examine how fundamental characteristics of the eco-
nomic environment influence decisions about the implementation of a QAS paying 
special attention to market structure and different forms of punishment. Clearly, QASs 
will be observed if ( )( ), , 0i r iE s y∏ ≥ π =  for some s S∈ , and 0y > , where iπ  is the 
profit level available in an alternative market. That is, if there is a combination of output 
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rate and QAS that makes the expected return of the value-added market positive, then the 
firm has an incentive to adopt the QAS and supply the high-price market. Throughout the 
analysis, we assume for mathematical convenience that there is a continuum of strin-
gency levels from which to choose.  
 
Monopolist Processor 
We begin our analysis by examining the case where there is only one processor in 
the market and the processor is trusted until proven wrong. Therefore, there are only two 
possible states of the world, denoted by 1,2r = . The first state denotes the periods in 
which the processor has a good reputation and hence faces a positive demand. In state 
two, the demand for the high-quality product is zero. Since there is only one processor, 
and profits are zero in the second state of the world, the superscript of the per-period 
profit function will be dropped.  
Let T  denote the time when reputation is lost because consumers discover that they 
purchased a product that does not meet the promised standards. A processor that moves 
from state 1 to state 2 in period T  has profits given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
1 1
1, , ; , ; , ;
1
TT T
t t
t t
s y y s a y s a y s a− −
= =
−β∏ = β π = π β = π −β∑ ∑  (1) 
where ( )π i  represents the per-period profits of a processor that has a good reputation and 
β  is the relevant discount factor. However, quality is random so the processor cannot ex-
ert perfect control over it. The processor’s expected profits are 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 ,1, , ; , , ;
1 1
TT E m s
E y s E y s a m s y s a
− β ω −β∏ = π ω = π −β −β 
, (2) 
where ( ),m s ω  denotes the probability that a processor with a QAS s  in place will stay 
in the value-added market for a trait with discoverability ω . In particular, note that the 
probability of staying in the market for two successive periods, ( ) ( ),m s sω = λ +  
( )( ) ( )1 1s− λ − ω , combines the probability that the resulting quality is high with the 
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probability of type II error weighted by the consumers’ level of awareness.4 A processor 
will face a zero demand in the second period with probability ( )1 ,m s− ω . 
We now need an expression for ( )( ),TE m sβ ω . Note that T is just counting the 
number of periods until the first notorious (discovered) failure. Since the outcome in a 
given period is independent of the outcome of other periods, T is the number of Bernoulli 
trials required to get the first failure. This is just the description of a geometric random 
variable with “success” probability ( )1 ,m s− ω . The previous observation allows us to 
obtain the required expression:  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )11 1
1 ,
, Pr , 1 ,
1 ,
tT t t
t t
m s
E m s T t m s m s
m s
∞ ∞ −
= =
− ω ββ ω = β = = β ω − ω = −β ω∑ ∑  
so that ( )( ) ( )( )
, ;
,
1 ,
y s a
E y s
m s
π∏ = −β ω . 
Antle (2001) classifies quality-control technologies for producing quality-
differentiated goods as process control, inspection, testing, and identity preservation. He 
argues that all these technologies except testing affect the variable costs of production. 
However, the costs of the testing technologies are not independent of the rate of output, 
since testing typically involves sampling a small proportion of the product. This discus-
sion reveals that the choices of stringency of the QAS to implement and the output rate 
are usually interrelated, specifically through the cost function. The processor’s problem is  
( )( ) ( )( )0, 0,
, ;
max , max
1 ,y s S y s S
y s a
E y s
m s≥ ∈ ≥ ∈
π∏ = −β ω  
and the corresponding first-order conditions are given by  
 
( )( ) ( ), , ; 0E y s y s a
y y
∂ ∏ ∂π= ≤∂ ∂ ,     0y ≥  (3) 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
,
, , ;
, ; 0
1 ,
m s
E y s y s a sy s a
s s m s
∂ ωβ∂ ∏ ∂π ∂= + π ≤∂ ∂ −β ω ,  0s ≥ . (4) 
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The Hessian for this problem is the 2x2 matrix in system (5) below. Equations (3) 
and (4) have the usual interpretation. Equation (3) is the standard necessary condition for 
the monopolist profit-maximization problem and will not be discussed further. Equation 
(4) states that the level of stringency should be increased until the marginal benefits of 
increased stringency equal the marginal costs. Marginal benefits of an increase in s equal 
the change in the proportion of purchases that are of high quality multiplied by the prob-
ability that low-quality output will be discovered,5 the per-period profit rate, and a factor 
that takes into account the multi-period nature of the problem at hand. The marginal 
benefits of increased assurance rise as the quality of the good is more readily observable 
by the processor’s customers and as the potential punishments for false certification be-
come more severe. Switching to the second state of the world is a harsher punishment 
when per-period profits are high and when the future is important to the processor. The 
marginal cost of an increase in s is simply the increase in costs that must be incurred to 
implement a more stringent QAS. The first-order conditions can in principle be solved to 
obtain the optimal choices for output and stringency of controls represented by 
( )* , ,y aω β  and ( )* , ,s aω β , respectively. We are interested in signing the following: 
*y∂ ∂ω , *s∂ ∂ω , *y∂ ∂β , *s∂ ∂β , *y a∂ ∂ , and *s a∂ ∂ . The first four of these can be 
signed under reasonable assumptions. Stronger assumptions are needed, however, to sign 
the last two derivatives.  
We next show that the ability of consumers to perceive quality increases the optimal 
level of stringency of the QAS and is likely to decrease the output rate. Differentiating 
the system of equations (3) and (4) with respect to ω  (at an interior solution) and using 
the chain rule, we get (after some rearrangement and omitting arguments for brevity) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
22
2
2
2 22
2
2 2
* 0
1*1
11
y
y sy
m m mmsm s sms s my s
 ∂ π∂ π ∂     ∂ ∂∂  ∂ω  = −  πβ ∂ ∂ ∂     −β +β∂∂ π ∂∂ π     + πβ ∂ ∂ω ∂ ∂ω  −β    ∂ω ∂ ∂ −β∂ ∂ 
. (5) 
Because the parameter ω  enters by itself only in equation (4) of the necessary condi-
tions, Samuelson’s conjugate pairs theorem immediately asserts that  
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( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
*sgn sgn 1
1
m m ms m
s sm
  πβ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = −β +β  ∂ω  ∂ ∂ω ∂ ∂ω−β   
. 
Recalling that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), 1 1m s s sω = λ + − λ −ω , the previous expression simplifies to  
( ) ( ) ( )2*sgn sgn 1 01s sm πβ ∂λ∂ = −β > ∂ω  ∂−β  . 
As consumers become more able to discern quality, processors will find it optimal to 
adopt more stringent controls. This result is similar in a sense to one of the findings of 
Darby and Karni (1973). These authors argued that it is very likely (albeit not necessarily 
true) that as consumers become more knowledgeable, the optimal amount of fraud is re-
duced.6 In our paper, firms would have incentives to reduce the number of mistakes they 
make as consumers become increasingly able to discern qualities.  
There exists a key trade-off between the benefits and costs of information acquisition 
on the part of processors. Having a more precise QAS, though costly, decreases the prob-
ability that firms will lose consumers’ trust. Furthermore, as the expected losses derived 
from consumer distrust increase, the payoff from the processor becoming better informed 
about actual quality increases. 
Using Cramer’s rule to solve for *y∂∂ω , we find that the sign is ambiguous without 
imposing further structure, since ω  enters by itself in equation (4). Moreover, system (5) 
(and the sign just uncovered) tells us that ( ) ( )2*sgn sgny y s∂ ∂ π=∂ω ∂ ∂ , which is not im-
plied by the maximization hypothesis alone. Since it is reasonable to assume that raising 
the levels of controls increases the marginal costs of production, and noting 
that
2 2C
y s y s
∂ π ∂= −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , we expect the optimal output rate to decrease as ω  increases.  
The question of how the value that producers place on the future affects the optimal 
choices of QAS and output levels can be explored through a similar exercise. The results 
of differentiating equations (3) and (4) with respect to β  and using Cramer’s rule (again 
omitting arguments) are as follows: 
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( ) ( )
2 2
1
2
* * 1
1 1
y s m mH
s m m y s y
−      ∂ ∂ ∂ β ∂ π ∂ π= + π −     ∂β ∂β ∂ −β −β ∂ ∂ ∂      
, 
where H is the Hessian matrix shown in (5). Thus we know that  
( )2 , ;*sgn sgn y s ay
y s
 ∂ π ∂ =   ∂β ∂ ∂   
 
and * 0s∂ ≥∂β . As the future becomes more important, it is more valuable for processors to 
invest in QASs that give them a longer expected presence in the market. The sign of *y∂∂β  
is ambiguous as before (and due to the exact same reasons). However, the previous dis-
cussion suggests it is negative. Increasing the expenses incurred to “learn” about the 
actual quality of the good increases variable costs of production, and hence it is optimal 
to cut back on the output rate. 
As mentioned before, stronger assumptions are needed to sign the last two deriva-
tives of interest. This is a direct result of the structure of the problem, where the strength 
of the demand for the valued attribute enters by itself in the two necessary conditions. 
The problem is that as a  increases, there is an incentive to increase both the rate of out-
put and the stringency of the QAS, since it increases the marginal benefit part in 
equations (3) and (4). However, as long as the technology is not nonjoint in inputs (see 
Chambers 1989), increasing either variable potentially has the effect of increasing the 
marginal-cost side of the other equation, thus making the net change ambiguous. The in-
tuition is that when the output rate increases, so does the marginal costs associated with 
any given QAS. Also, increases in the profitability of the market for value-added prod-
ucts provide incentives to monitor product quality more closely to delay transition to the 
second state. However, this increases marginal costs of production. If it is appropriate to 
assume that the technology is nonjoint in inputs, then 2 0y s∂ π ∂ ∂ =  obtains, and both 
*y a∂ ∂  and *s a∂ ∂  are positive whenever revenues and marginal revenues increase 
with the strength of the demand parameter. 
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Duopoly Processors with Public Reputation 
We consider first the situation where an entire industry can lose consumer trust as a 
result of the actions of one participant. Hennessy, Roosen, and Miranowski (2001) model 
a related issue and conclude that even when firms in the food industry may profit by in-
creased investments in safety (assuming a leadership role), they may obtain higher levels 
of benefits by free riding on the efforts of other chain participants. In the first state of this 
case, all processors have a good reputation. In the second, all sellers are punished by con-
sumers.  
We model this situation as a potentially infinitely lived duopoly game, where the 
termination time is random. The uncertainty comes again from the fact that processors 
cannot exert absolute control on the quality of the good they procure and/or produce. Rob 
and Sekiguchi (2001) model a similar situation. However, in their model, firms compete 
in price in the second period, and only one firm is able to make sales until it loses its 
reputation and the other occupies its place. When the second firm loses the market, con-
sumers switch back to the first firm, and so on. 
In the first stage, the two processors decide once and for all, independently and in a 
non-cooperative fashion, what QAS to implement. After observing each other’s choice of 
QAS, processors compete a la Cournot. Production and QAS technologies are known by 
both firms. Consumers buy the product at the end of the first period and update their be-
liefs about the quality of the industry’s output. In the periods to follow, firms keep 
competing in output, and consumers keep updating their beliefs, until a failure occurs and 
is detected by consumers. In that period, confidence is lost by the entire industry forever.  
We work backwards, first finding the equilibrium level of output after technologies 
have been chosen, and then solving the first-stage problem applying the second-period 
equilibrium rules. The second-stage problem is a standard Cournot game. Following the 
same argument used to construct the monopolist’s objective function in the previous sec-
tion, we find that firm i ’s expected profit is  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
,1
,1 , ,( , )
1
i
i i i i
i i i i
y y s
E y s
m s m s
−
− −
π∏ = −β , 
where ,1iπ  denotes per-period profits of player i  in state 1, and ( ),i iy y y−=  represents a 
vector of output. Because per-period profits are zero if the firm has lost its reputation, we 
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drop the superscript that indexes the state of the world. Since both is  and is−  are prede-
termined, the problem is to choose the level of output that maximizes per-period profits 
in the standard way to find the Nash equilibrium levels ( )* ,i i iy s s− , 1,2i = . We can now 
write the first-stage problem for firm i  as 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
* *, , , , ,
max max
1 1i i
i i
i i i i i i i i i
s S s S
i i i i i i i i
y s s y s s s s s
m s m s m s m s
− − − −
∈ ∈− − − −
 π  π=    −β −β  
, 
which has the first-order condition   
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ), ,1 0 0 1,2
1 1
i i
i i i i i i i i
i
i i i i i i i i i i
s s s s m s m s
s i
m s m s s m s m s s
− − − −
− − − −
 ∂π π β ∂+ ≤ ≥ =  −β ∂ −β ∂ 
 (6) 
and the corresponding complementary slackness conditions. Note that if it is difficult to 
detect quality deviations (i.e., when 0ω→ ), the model predicts that processors will find 
it optimal not to invest in quality assurance (the solution will tend to the corner 
( )* *1 20, 0s s= = ).7 The same result holds if 0β =  or when the probability that the proces-
sor’s rival is caught is close to one.  
The second-order sufficient conditions are  
( )
2 1 2 1
2
1,1 1,2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2
2,1 2,2 1 2
2
2 1 2
1
1
E E
a a s s s
A
a a E Em m
s s s
 ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏ ∂ ∂ ∂   = =   ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏−β   ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
( )2 2, 2 21 0
i
i i
i i i i i
i i
ma m m m
s s− −
∂ π ∂= −β + π β ≤∂ ∂  
( ) ( )
2
, 1 1
i i i
i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
m m ma m m m
s s s s m m s s
−
− − −
− − − −
∂ π ∂π ∂ π β ∂ ∂= −β + β +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −β ∂ ∂   
and 
, , , , 0i i i i i i i ia a a a− − − −Ω = − > , 
for 1,2i = . 
The system of equations (6) implicitly defines the processor’s best response func-
tions, ( )i ib s− , 1,2i = . A vector of investments in safety ( )* *1 2,s s  is a Nash equilibrium for 
this model if and only if ( )* *i is b s−=  for 1,2i = . If an equilibrium for this stage exists, we 
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can then compute the output quantities and prices using the equilibrium rules for the 
Cournot game that will be played at the second stage.   
We now investigate the nature of the competition by studying a key property, the slope 
of the best-response functions. To that end, we substitute the best-response function of firm 
i  into its first-order condition and differentiate it (at an interior solution) with respect to the 
choice of its rival. After rearranging and omitting arguments for brevity, we get 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
1
,
1
1 1
1
i i
ii i
i
i i i i i i i i ii
i i i i i
m mm
s s s m m s s m mb s
s a m m
−
−
− − − − −−
−
− −
 ∂ π ∂ β ∂π ∂+ + π ∂ ∂ ∂ −β ∂ ∂ −β∂  = −∂ −β . (7) 
The denominator of this expression is negative by the sufficient conditions for a maxi-
mum. Thus, the sign of the slope of the best-response function is the same as the sign of the 
numerator (see Dixit 1986). The first term is negative, since as one firm increases invest-
ments in safety this reduces the benefits derived from increases in its rivals’ expenditures 
on QASs.8 By a similar argument, and the assumption that more stringent systems yield 
better products, the last two terms are positive. Overall, the sign is ambiguous without fur-
ther structure, but close inspection of equation (7) reveals some insights into its sign.  
First, if the probability of success for both processors is high, and the future is val-
ued, the best-response function will likely slope upwards. Second, if the cross-partial 
terms are close to zero, for example, if the products are not close substitutes, the slope 
will be positive. But neither condition is necessary to obtain upward-sloping reaction 
functions. Downward-sloping reaction functions may arise only when the cross effects 
are strong compared with the profitability of the industry.  
Hence, the structure of the problem makes several types of interaction plausible. Free 
riding would be represented by downward-sloping best-response functions. Following the 
language of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), QASs are “strategic substi-
tutes.” If one firm invests heavily in a QAS, it will be a weak competitor in the second 
stage. It then may be worthwhile for the other processor to free ride on the consumer trust 
obtained by the other firm’s investments. Though mathematically possible, it is hard to 
rationalize a situation in which a processor would choose stringent levels of assurance, 
believing that its rival will put a lax system in place. If the processor’s rival invests little 
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in quality, the firm will face a tough Cournot competitor for the few periods the market is 
expected to last, which acts as a double incentive to implement less stringent QASs. 
A more plausible and intuitively appealing scenario is that of QASs being “strategic 
complements.” That is, reaction functions have an upward slope. When a processor’s ri-
val puts a lax QAS in place, the firm will find little incentive to invest in quality 
assurance. As the processor’s rival increases the stringency of the QAS, the firm will 
have two types of incentives to raise its own investments. First, the market will last 
longer. Second, quantity competition will be milder, which increases per period margins 
and makes more stringent systems worthwhile. 
Now when the capacity of consumers to perceive quality increases, the direction of 
the response in the levels of assurance is ambiguous. Following Dixit (1986), we totally 
differentiate the system of first-order conditions to get 
( ) ( )( )
2 1 2 1 2 1
2
1,1 1,2 1 1 2 11 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2,1 2,2 2 21 1 2 2
2
2 1 2 2
1
1
E E E d
a a s s s sds ds
a a ds dsE E Em s m s d
s s s s
   ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏ ω   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ω        = = −        ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏−β      ω   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ω   
 
where ,i ia  and ,i ia − , for 1,2i =  are as previously defined. The system can in principle be 
solved to obtain 
 
2 1*
1
2,2 1,2 1
* 2 2
2,1 1,12
2
1
Eds
a a sd
a ads E
d s
 ∂ ∏     − ∂ ∂ω ω    =  −  Ω ∂ ∏      ω ∂ ∂ω   
 (8)  
where again the stability conditions are ( )1,1 2,2 1,2 2,1 0a a a aΩ = − >  and , 0i ia <  for 1,2i = .  
The decisions of both processors are equal, so it suffices to analyze the responses of 
processor 1. From equation (8), the change in the optimal stringency of assurance for firm 
1 is given by 
 
* 2 1 2 2
1
2,2 1,2
1 2
1ds E Ea a
d s s
 ∂ ∏ ∂ ∏= − + ω Ω ∂ ∂ω ∂ ∂ω 
. (9) 
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The sign of expression (9) is ambiguous in general. However, we can further analyze 
some cases. From the stability conditions, we know that Ω  is positive and 2,2a  is nega-
tive. Nothing more can be ascertained without imposing further structure. If symmetry is 
assumed (as it is here) the cross-partial terms are equal and hence we need to sign only 
one of them.  
We study the case in which QASs are strategic complements.9 From the previous 
analysis we know that this case arises when 1,2 0a > . Using the stability conditions, we 
immediately see that  
* 2 1
1
1
sgn sgnds E
d s
   ∂ ∏=   ω ∂ ∂ω   
. 
Cross-partial differentiation of the objective function and some rather tedious rearranging 
yields 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )12 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 23
1 11 1 2 2
,
2 1
1
s s sE m s m s
s sm s m s
π ∂λ∂ ∏ = −β −∂ ∂ω ∂−β , 
which implies ( ) ( )( )( )*1 2 2 2 2sgn sgn 2 1ds m s m sd  = −β − ω  . The expression within paren-
theses is a quadratic equation with negative coefficient ( )1,0−β∈ − . It is straightforward 
to check that the expression is positive if and only if 02 ,1m m ∈   , where 0m  is the only 
root (in the unit interval) of the quadratic equation. This shows that if assurance systems 
are complementary, processors will increase their investments in quality only if their ri-
val’s probability of success is above a certain threshold given by 0m . Note also that this 
condition is conducive to the property of strategic complementarity. For small values of 
2m , processor 1 will find it optimal to reduce investments in quality as consumers be-
come more knowledgeable. 
In summary, when reputations are public, we show that QASs can potentially be stra-
tegic complements or substitutes. However, we argue that the former is more plausible. 
For this case, we showed that firms will implement more stringent QASs as the ability of 
consumers to perceive quality increases (provided that their rivals’ probability of main-
taining consumers’ approval is high enough).    
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Duopoly When Reputation Is Private 
We now turn to the case in which reputation is a private good. The structure of the 
problem is similar to the previous analysis in that firms have to choose the optimal level 
of investment in QASs that affects quality stochastically and then compete in quantities 
for the random number of periods in which they have consumers’ approval. The key dif-
ference with the previous section is that in this scenario when a processor fails, the rival 
benefits because it increases its market share. We still maintain the assumption that firms 
will be trusted until proven wrong. Unlike the situation in which reputation is a public 
good, when a processor’s reputation is lost, the other processor fills the market and be-
haves as a monopolist until its product fails and is discovered by consumers. 
To accommodate this sequencing we need to expand the number of states of the 
world from 2 to 4. In state 1, both processors are trusted. State 2 arises if processor 2 
loses its reputation. In state 3, processor 2 acts as a monopolist. The market disappears 
when state 4 is reached (both processors lose reputation). Reputations can then be mod-
eled as following a stochastic process, where the probabilities of reaching the different 
states of the world are affected by the choices made by the market participants. Since 
only the immediate past determines the state of the world in the following period, the sto-
chastic process exhibits the Markov property. Therefore, it is natural to use the concept of 
a Markov process to model the dynamics of this market.  
A Markov process is defined by the possible states of the system, the transition ma-
trix, and a vector that records the initial state (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2000). The states of 
the world are described in the previous paragraph, and the assumption that processors 
will be trusted until proven wrong is equivalent to assuming that the system starts at the 
first state with probability one (and hence the remaining three entries of the initial state 
vector are assigned zero probability). The transition matrix M  is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 0 1
m m m m m m m m
m m
M
m m
− − − −  − =  −  
. 
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The probabilities of success ( )1 1m s  and ( )2 2m s  are defined as before. Then, entry 
,i jM  denotes the probability that the system will be in state j  in the next period, given 
that the current state is i . Note that any state can follow state 1, but neither state 1 nor 
state 3 can be reached after state 2. In the jargon of Markov chains, state 4 is absorbing, 
that is, once it is reached, the system stays in it forever, or, alternatively, it will go to 
other states with probability zero. Note that as required in a Markov matrix, all the entries 
are nonnegative and 4 ,1 1
j
i jj
M== =∑  for 1,...,4i = .10  
With this in place and noting that processor 1 makes zero profits in states 3 and 4, we 
can write the firm’s first-stage problem as  
 ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
0 1
max max , ,i i T j j T
s S s S i j
E s s e M e s s e M e
∞ ∞
∈ ∈ = =
    ∏ = π β + π β       ∑ ∑  (10) 
where 1,2k = , 1kπ , denotes per period profits for processor 1 when there are k  market 
participants; ke  is a 4x1 vector that has zeros everywhere except for a 1 in the kth posi-
tion; and T is the transpose operator. 
Equation (10) specifies that processors maximize the profits in the duopoly and mo-
nopoly situation, weighted by the likelihood of the different scenarios, which they can 
affect by the stringency of the QAS they choose. The first-order condition for this prob-
lem is given by 
 
1 1
1 12 1
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2
0 0 1 11 1 1 1
0
i j
i i T i T j j T j T
i i j j
M M
e M e e e e M e e e
s s s s
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
= = = =
∂π ∂ ∂π ∂β + π β + β + π β ≤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , (11) 
with equality if 1 0s > . Of course, a symmetric equation exists for the other processor. 
Equation (11) has the usual interpretation. Processors will equate marginal benefits 
(given by the second and fourth terms in (11)) against marginal costs (given by the first 
and third terms in (11)) in their choice of QAS. The new terms are associated with the 
introduction of the possibility of being a monopolist if firm 2 loses its reputation first. An 
equilibrium for this model is again a pair of QASs ( )1 2,s s  such that ( )* *i i is b s−= , 1,2i = , 
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where ( )ib i  represents the best-response function of player i . Given the complexity of 
the model, further analysis requires a bit more specification and the use of numerical 
simulations. We conduct such simulations next using linear demands and constant mar-
ginal costs to give additional insight into how the nature of competition and reputations 
are likely to influence the choice of QASs.  
 
Numerical Simulations 
Assume that consumers’ valuation of the homogenous final product in each period 
can be represented by a utility function of the form  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2, 2 2U y y a y I y I b y y y y= + − + + , (12) 
where a  and b  are parameters, and ( )1 2,I I  are indicator functions denoting the state of 
the world. The specific form of the indicators will depend on the structure of the market 
and the nature of the reputations. Consumers choose quantities to maximize 
( )1 2 1 1 2 2,U y y p y p y− − .  
The link between the stringency of the QAS and the probability of obtaining a prod-
uct of good quality is given by the monotonic and concave function ( )
1
ss
s
λ = + . 
Therefore, we assume that if investments in quality are zero, processors will be obtaining 
a high-quality product with probability zero. This sort of link is more likely to occur 
when quality is given by cost-increasing practices. When the variability is natural and 
processors just need to select what input to buy, it may be more reasonable to employ a 
link that assigns equal probability to obtaining a good product and incurring a statistical 
type II error when investments in quality are zero.11 We begin by specifying the objective 
functions for each situation studied. 
Monopolist Processor 
The monopoly situation can be obtained by setting 2 0I = . 1 1I =  if the processor is 
trusted and zero otherwise. This yields an inverse demand function for good 1 given by 
( )1 1 1 1p y aI by= − , and hence per-period profits (after substitution of the equilibrium out-
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put levels) are ( )21*1 1 4a s bπ = − . Plugging this back into the monopolist problem, we 
obtain  
( )
( )( )( )1
2
1
1
max
4 1 1s S
a s
b s∈
−
−β − ω+ ωλ . 
 
Duopoly Situation when Reputation Is a Public Good 
This case is obtained by letting 1I  and 2I  equal one if no failure has been detected 
and zero otherwise. The inverse demand for processor i  is given by ( )1 2,ip y y =  
1 2( )iaI b y y− + . Then, equilibrium quantities for the second stage and per-period profits 
are easily found to be ( )* 2
3
i i
i
a s s
y
b
−− +=  and ( ) ( )
2
*
2
2
,
9
i i i
i i
a s s
s s
b
−
−
− +π = , 1,2i = . 
Plugging this into the first-stage problem, we find that processor’s 1 objective is given by 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )1
2
1 2
1 2
2
max
9 1 1 1s S
a s s
b s s∈
− +
−β − ω+ ωλ −ω+ ωλ . 
 
Duopoly Situation when Reputation Is a Private Good 
For this case, 1I  equals one in states 1 and 2 and zero otherwise. Also, 2I  equals one 
in states 1 and 3, and zero otherwise. As long as the stochastic process stays in the initial 
state (both processors have good reputations), per-period profits are as in the duopoly 
situation previously presented. When the system reaches states 2 or 3, the monopolist’s 
per-period profit (also previously presented) becomes relevant. Here, the problem of 
processor 1 is 
( ) ( )
1
2 2
1 2 1
1 1 1 2
0 1
2
max
9 4
j j T j j T
s S j j
a s s a s
e M e e M e
b b
∞ ∞
∈ = =
 − + − β + β   ∑ ∑ . 
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Results and Discussion 
In this section, we examine the solutions to the problems posed and study how 
changes in the economic environment affect the equilibrium levels of stringency of the 
QAS implemented, associated expected profits for firms, and utility for consumers. Spe-
cifically, we study how the structure of the industry, nature of reputations, and ability of 
consumers to detect quality deviations affect the equilibrium outcomes.  
Figure 1 presents the best-response functions for the two duopoly scenarios. Under 
the specific parameterization and if reputation is public, reaction curves slope upwards. 
Processors find few incentives to invest in QASs when the market is not going to last 
long (i.e., when their rivals invest little in quality) and when they expect to face a tough 
(low-cost) Cournot competitor in the following periods. However, as previously dis-
cussed, processors find it worthwhile to put more stringent systems in place if they 
anticipate their rivals will do the same thing. For the market to last more than a few peri-
ods, and compensate the investments in quality assurance, both players need to invest in 
high levels of s in this scenario. 
When reputations are private goods, reaction curves have a negative slope. That is, 
when reputations are private goods, as processors anticipate their rivals will put a lax sys-
tem in place, it is worthwhile to invest in a more stringent QAS. The driving force is that 
processors find it beneficial to give up some of the duopoly profits while increasing the 
likelihood of outlasting the rival and capturing the entire market. But when a processor  
 
 
FIGURE 1. Best-response functions of firms ( 50a = , 1b = , 0.5ω = , 0.9β = ) 
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anticipates its rival will invest heavily in quality assurance (and will become harder to 
outlast), the best the firm can do is to reduce its own expenses and try to capture a higher 
per-period duopoly profit.  
Comparing the stringency of assurance across the different types of reputation, Fig-
ure 1 reveals that, as expected, the equilibrium investments in QASs are lower when 
reputation is a public good. When firms do not capture the full returns from their QASs, 
they will under-invest in quality and try to free ride on other firms’ investments. Brand-
ing for example, could be seen as an effort to convert reputations into a private good and 
hence capture a higher share of the returns to investments in QASs.12 Economic theory 
predicts that if branding allows processors to capture the returns to their investments, it 
will result in higher levels of quality assurance. Also, though costlier QASs result in 
lower per-period outputs, the expected total production (and hence consumption) is 
higher when reputation is a private good. This is driven by the fact that more stringent 
controls result in a longer duopoly stage (in addition to any output produced during the 
later monopoly periods).13 
Results (not shown, but see endnote 13) indicate that monopoly total output levels 
are higher than under duopoly when reputations are public in nature but not when reputa-
tions are private. This illustrates that both firms and consumers can benefit when firms 
have large incentives to protect their reputations.  
Figure 2 shows that as consumers can detect quality deviations more easily, the equi-
librium levels of stringency increase for all market structures and natures of reputation  
considered.14 As discussed before, when quality is a credence attribute, firms will find it 
optimal not to invest in QASs. Firms do not have incentives to avoid punishments that 
have zero probability of occurrence. The level of stringency is always greater when repu-
tation is a private good. Furthermore, it reveals that the monopolist will provide the 
highest quality (in expectations). Monopolists are the ones that will lose the most if a 
quality deviation occurs and is detected. 
Figure 3 shows that expected profits decline as consumers can more readily discern 
quality. The reason is the increased cost of the optimal QAS and the increased probability 
that a firm will lose its reputation. This (envelope) result is not sensitive to the particular 
parameterization. Figure 3 also suggests that firms have an incentive to privatize their 
reputations. For example, many food retailers sell products labeled with their own brand  
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FIGURE 2. Equilibrium responses of the stringency of controls to changes in quality 
observability ( 50a = , 1b = , 0.9β = ) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Equilibrium responses of expected profits to changes in quality  
observability ( 50a = , 1b = , 0.9β = ) 
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FIGURE 4. Equilibrium expected utility for the three scenarios considered for differ-
ent levels of quality observability ( 50a = , 1b = , 0.9β = ) 
 
 
as high-quality products (Noelke and Caswell 2000). The drawback of this strategy is that 
when a problem occurs, the firms are identified with these brands and are clear targets in 
the marketplace (Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen 2002). 
It is not possible to state which situation yields higher welfare in general. Processors 
would prefer, as expected, to be the only market participants and for reputations to be 
private rather than public goods. It is also clear from Figure 4 that consumers prefer the  
scenario of a duopoly with private reputations to that of a monopoly with collective repu 
tations. However, consumers’ choice between monopoly and duopoly with public reputa-
tions depends on the level of quality observability. In short, we can only say that the 
duopoly situation with collective reputations is Pareto dominated by the other duopoly 
scenario considered.15 This discussion provides support for some of the policies proposed 
by Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2002) to overcome some causes of systemic risk in the 
food industry. The authors advocate for strategies such as improving traceability, testing, 
mandated labeling, and interpreting policies on mergers more leniently for the food in-
dustry. Our results suggest that market concentration and/or identification of firms 
producing a given unit of output may result in higher overall welfare.  
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Conclusions 
There exists a great disparity in existing QASs concerning the degree of stringency 
(and associated costs) of the systems employed. We provide a rationale for those differ-
ences based on market structure, the nature of the reputation mechanisms, and the size of 
the markets or strength in demand for value-added products and whether the sought-after 
attributes are credence, experience, or a mixture of both. We argue that QASs can be seen 
as efforts made by firms to position themselves strategically in a marketplace where con-
sumers can differentiate between firms that deliver quality goods and those that deliver 
substandard quality.  
Three models are developed to accommodate the different scenarios (monopoly, du-
opoly with collective reputations, and duopoly with private reputations), and predictions 
are obtained through comparative statics and numerical simulations. The latter are per-
formed under the widely used assumptions of linear demands and constant marginal costs.  
Our results suggest that monopolists will invest more heavily in quality assurance than 
will duopolists. In addition, being able to capitalize on the full returns (no free riding or ex-
ternalities) of investments in quality provides further incentives to employ more stringent 
QASs. That is, under the collective reputations scenario, duopolists will reduce their ex-
pected quality. Also, as the ability of consumers to detect the actual quality of the good 
increases, it is likely that the stringency of the quality controls will increase. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, our numerical simulations show that the size of the market (and hence the po-
tential premiums) has a positive impact on the level of investments in quality.  
In terms of welfare, we can only say that the duopoly with private reputations Pareto 
dominates the collective reputation scenario. However, it is less straightforward to com-
pare the results of the monopoly situation with that of the other scenarios. Processors of 
course prefer the monopoly over any of the duopoly situations. Consumers prefer the du-
opoly with private reputations over the other two scenarios considered. However, under 
some conditions (when the level of quality observability is high, or if consumers value 
the future highly), consumers will prefer the monopoly over the duopoly with public 
reputations. Hence, our model suggests that it is not clear that market concentration hurts 
consumers when there is a trade-off between quantity and quality, and the latter is imper-
fectly observable. Additionally, if there is no way that the producer of a given unit of 
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output can be identified among several firms (if it is not possible to develop private repu-
tations), overall welfare may be increased by promoting the existence of a monopoly 
(under the conditions just noted). 
  
 
Endnotes 
1. There is a large body of literature showing that when certification is imperfect, some 
producers of low quality will apply for and obtain certification. See De and Nabar 
1991 and Mason and Sterbenz 1994. 
2. Hennessy (1996) and Chalfant et al. (1999) showed that imperfect testing and grad-
ing lead to under-investment in quality-enhancing techniques by farmers. This is 
because producers of low quality impose an externality on producers of high quality. 
3. This assumption is consistent with a large body of work in the marketing and psy-
chology literature (see, e.g., Oliver 1997; Rust and Oliver 2000; and Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984), where negative events generate stronger and more rapid reactions 
than positive events.  
4. Note that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1 1m s s s s= + − − = − +ω λ λ ω ω ωλ  is the convex combi-
nation between the true probability of having a product of high quality and one. We 
see that as 0→ω , ( ), 1m s →ω , and the processors are expected to stay in state 1 for a 
large number of periods, even if they are offering a product that does not meet the 
promised standards.  
5. Recall that ( ) ( ),m s s
s s
∂ ∂=∂ ∂
ω λω . 
6. Note that in Darby and Karni’s (1973) paper, supplying firms knew the actual quality 
of the product (repair services) they were offering. 
7. To see this, recall that ( ) ( )1i im s sω ωλ= − + , and ( ) ( )0 0lim lim 0.i i i
i i
m s s
s sω ω
λω→ →
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂  
8. By increasing its first-period investments in QASs, a firm is raising its own costs for 
the second-stage competition, which benefits its rivals. However, these benefits are 
lower if the rivals also increase their costs. 
9. For strategic substitutes, the optimal adjustment will depend not only on the sign of 
the cross partial studied below but also on the relative magnitude of 1,1a  and 1,2a . To 
see this, impose symmetry and rewrite ( )* 2 11 2,2 1,2
1
1ds Ea a
d s
∂ ∏= − +ω Ω ∂ ∂ω . 
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10. Note that the case where reputations is a public good, is also a Markov process, but 
with only two possible states (that would correspond to the first and fourth states of 
the current setting). 
11. An example would be ( )
1
s
s
es
e
λ = + . 
12. However, as Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2002) note, branding also provides a 
target to consumers in the marketplace when a problem occurs (more on this to fol-
low). 
13. A figure illustrating this point is available from the authors upon request. 
14. Though not presented, as the demand for high-quality products (parameterized by a ) 
rises, the stringency of the QAS under all scenarios increases. 
15. Note that if consumers value the future more than producers, or beta is close to 1 
(higher than 0.98), the expected utility from the monopoly scenario exceeds that of 
the duopoly with public reputations for all ω . In those cases, the monopoly scenario 
would also Pareto dominate the duopoly with public reputations. 
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